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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

JOHN VONDERHAAR HALTOM,

Case No. 20070498-L'A

Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE CASE
Defendant was convicted of dealing in material harmful to a minor, a till I'd

ik'i'ivr

felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1206 (West 2004). The conviction was
affirmed. Sec State v. Haltom, -!U()5 1' I App 34 X. 121 l'.3d42,a^W,2007UT22,156P.3d
792, cert, denied, 128 S M i 06 (2007).
Defendant now appeals from an order made after judgment denying his motion lo
reduce the degree of his conviction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402 (West Supp.
2007). I his (\uii1 has jurisdiciion lo determine the appeal. Sec 11 tab Code Ann. §§ 77-18a1(1)0) & 78-2a-3(2)(e) (West 2004).

STATEMENT OF ISSUE AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
A trial court has the discretion to reduce a conviction by one degree if the court finds
reduction is in the "interest of justice." See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402 [hereafter "402"].
In this case, defendant moved three times for a 402 reduction, once before sentencing and
twice following the termination of his probation. All three motions were denied. Defendant
challenges only the third denial.
Issue: Did the trial court properly exercise its discretion in finding that a 2007
amendment in the statutory definition of "harmful to minors" does not justify reduction of
defendant's 2004 conviction for dealing in material harmful to a minor?
A trial court's refusal to reduce the degree of a conviction pursuant to section 76-3402 is accorded great deference and reviewed only for abuse of discretion. State v. Boyd,
2001 UT 30, H 31,25 P.3d 985 (citing State v. Woodland, 945 P.2d 665, 671 (Utah 1997)).1
STATUTES, RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Utah Code Annotated § 76-3-402(2) provides:

Siting State v. Virgin, 2006 UT 29, 137 P.3d 787, defendant argues that only
"some deference" is accorded a trial court's decision denying a 402 motion and that this
Court may consider the 402 motion "de novo." See Brief of Appellant [Br.Aplt.] at 2 &
Point I. This is incorrect.
Virgin's "some deference" standard is limited to mixed questions of law and fact
and, consequently, does not apply here. See State v. Graham, 2006 UT 43, ^f 16 n.7, 143
P.3d 268 (limiting Virgin, 2006 UT 29, K 26), cert, denied, 127 S. Ct 983 (2007). In
contrast, "great deference" is accorded a 402 decision because such decisions, like
sentencing, "necessarily reflect the personal judgment of the [trial] court." State v.
Albiston, 2005 UT App 425U (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). See also
Boyd, 2001 UT 30, % 31; Woodland, 945 P.2d at 671.
2

(2) If the court suspends the execution of the sentence and places the defendant
on probation, whether or not the defendant is committed to jail as a condition
of probation, the court may enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower
degree of offense:
(a) after the defendant has been successfully discharged from probation;
(b) upon motion and notice to the prosecuting attorney;
(c) after reasonable effort has been made by the prosecuting attorney to
provide notice to any victims;
(d) after a hearing if requested by either party under Subsection (2)(c);
and
(e) if the court finds entering a judgment of conviction for the next
lower degree of offense is in the interest of justice.
See Addendum A for the complete text of this and any other statute cited in argument.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant Is Convicted of a Felony. In 2000, defendant was charged with dealing
in material harmful to a minor, a third degree felony, in violation of section 76-10-1206 (R.
2-3, 186-88). In 2003, a jury rejected defendant's claim that it was his employee's, not his
own, fault, that the crime occurred and found him guilty (R. 416-25, 428-31; R679: 309).
Defendant's First 402 Motion Is Denied. Before sentencing, defendant moved to
reduce the degree of his conviction from a third degree felony to a class A misdemeanor
pursuant to section 76-3-402(1) (R680: 1-8). See Add. A. Defendant claimed that a
reduction was justified because he reasonably relied on his off-duty employee to check the
minor's identification before a sexually-explicit video was sold to her and because the crime
of dealing in material harmful to a minor should be a misdemeanor and not a felony (id.).
Judge Dennis M. Fuchs, who presided over defendant's trial, opined that defendant's
argument might support a mitigation in sentence, but did not justify a reduction in the degree
3

ofthe legislatively-proscribed offense (R6 80:11-15) (Addendum B). Nevertheless, the judge
explained that he "made it a policy... not [to] restrict anybody from [re-]filing a 402 motion
at the time that their probation is concluded" and encouraged defendant to do so if he wished
(id.). Judge Fuchs then denied defendant's 402 motion (id.).
Defendant Receives a Felony Sentence. In 20043 defendant was sentenced (R. 673;
R681: 7-9). Judge Fuchs stated that he would consider defendant's prior arguments in
sentencing him, but again opined that they did not justify reduction ofthe conviction:
Let me just tell you up front, the Court did say in the course of [the 402
hearing] arguments that were made to the Court, that there were some
mitigating circumstances. I don't think any of those circumstances arise to the
level, without the State's approval, of this Court reducing the conviction from
a third-degree felony to a Class A misdemeanor.
There are issues that the Court will take into account for purposes of
sentencing, mitigating factors based on the facts ofthe trial that I heard, but I
see no basis whatsoever for this Court to go against any recommendation of
the State, or even if they're quiet, and without their approval - . . . - to reduce
this conviction to a Class A misdemeanor. So, that-that's wherel'mcoming
from. As far as the Court is concerned, I'm sentencing Mr. Haltom on a thirddegree felony.
(R681: 3-4). The judge specifically addressed defendant's claim that the fault for the illegal
sale was more his employee's than his:
And in this particular instance, I do think that the jury had enough information
to believe that you were extremely reckless, that your business practices might
have been somewhat lax at the time that this occurred. And you, as the owner,
and also you, as an individual directly involved in this sale, are responsible for
it. And there's a penalty to pay, again, as long as you want to maintain this
type of a business.
And as far as I'm concerned, you know, you're welcome in the
community to operate a business, like anybody else, as long as you do it legally
and just follow the laws.
4

(R681: 8). The court then sentenced defendant to the statutory term of zero-to-five years
imprisonment and ordered him to pay a $5,000.00 fine. The sentence was suspended upon
condition that defendant serve 30 days in jail, pay $2000.00 of the fine, and successfully
complete 36-month term of probation (R681: 9).
Defendant appealed his conviction, but did not challenge his sentence or the denial
of his 402 motion. The conviction was affirmed. See Haltom, 2005 UT App 348,ffif26-27,
affd, 2007 UT 22, *{ 9 (Addendum E).
Defendant's Second 402 Motion Is Denied. In 2005, defendant moved for early
termination of his "parole" and again for reduction of his conviction to a misdemeanor,
though this time pursuant to section 76-3-402(2) (R. 686-87). See Add. A. The trial court
informed defendant that no termination or reduction would be considered unless Adult
Probation & Parole [AP & P] and the prosecutor agreed (R. 703). The prosecutor objected
to both early termination and reduction of the conviction because defendant had not
acknowledged his wrongdoing and his appeal was still pending (R. 706). A month later, after
AP & P recommended that defendant's probation be terminated because he resided in
Nebraska, the court terminated probation, but deferred consideration of the second 402
motion until the appeal was resolved (R. 686, 709, 728-29).

5

The state appellate process was completed in February 2007. See Haltom, 2007 UT
22 {Add. E). The district court then reassigned the case to Judge Randall N. Skanchy because
Judge Fuchs had retired.2
Defendant then filed a memorandum in support of the pending 402 motion (R. 73741). In it, defendant argued that the Haltom appellate decisions were not "reasonable
interpretation^]" of the dealing in material harmful to a minor statute and "compromise[d]
his rights to free expression under the First Amendment" (R. 739-40). He also informed the
court that in 2000, the same year of the Utah offense, he was charged and ultimately
convicted of illegally distributing obscene materials in Nebraska. Defendant argued that
because the Nebraska conviction involving adults was a misdemeanor, the Utah conviction
involving minors should be reduced to a misdemeanor (R. 774-92).
On March 28, 2007, Judge Skanchy formally denied defendant's second 402 motion
(R. 793-94) (Addendum Q .

The court stated that it had reviewed "the nature and

circumstances of the offense and the history and character of the defendant," together with
the parties's memoranda and oral arguments, but found no reason to view a felony conviction
as unduly harsh (id.). Defendant does not challenge this ruling on appeal.

2

Defendant argues that Judge Fuchs intended to grant this second 402 motion, but
then retired. See Br.Aplt. at 15-16. To the contrary, in denying the first 402 motion and
in sentencing defendant, Judge Fuchs opined that the felony conviction was appropriate
and defendant must face the consequences of his illegal acts. The judge also twice voiced
his unwillingness to reduce the legislatively-proscribed degree of the offense (R680: 1113;R681:7-10).
6

Defendant's Third 402 Motion Is Denied. Eight days after the second 402 motion
was formally denied, defendant filed a third 402 motion (R. 796-97, 799-804).3
The third 402 motion offered but one reason to reduce the conviction. In 2007, the
Utah Legislature amended the definition of "harmful to minors" found in Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-10-1201 (4) (West Supp. 2007). According to defendant, the amendment "repealed" the
crime of dealing in material harmful to a minor found in section 76-10-1206(1) and justified
reduction of his felony conviction to a misdemeanor (R. 766-97 & 799-804; R903: 1). The
prosecutor responded that the 2007 amendment, a change in preposition, was a mistake that
the sponsor intended to remedy in the next legislative session (R. 861-62; R903: 2-4).
Alternatively, the prosecutor argued that under Utah law, a subsequent amendment to a
statute does not affect on a prior judgment and, therefore, the 2007 amendment was of no
consequence (R. 863-65; R903: 2).
On June 12, 2007, the trial court found that the 2007 amendment did not affect the
appropriateness of defendant's 2004 conviction and denied the third 402 motion (R. 886-88)
{Addendum D). It this denial which defendant now challenges (R. 889).

3

Defendant characterized the motion as an "amended" second motion (R. 796-97).
The prosecutor correctly noted, however, that because the second motion had already
been formally denied, the new motion was a third motion that raised a new ground not
raised in either of the prior motions (R. 860-61, 863). Though the prosecutor argued that
the third motion was untimely, the trial court ruled on its merits (R. 863, 886-88).

7

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts of defendant's crime are adequately set forth in this Court's and the supreme
court's prior Haltom decisions. In sum, a seventeen-year-old girl, who was assisting the
police, entered defendant's sexually-oriented business, showed defendant her real driver's
license which contained her true birth date, and purchased a sexually-explicit video. Before
making the sale, defendant inspected the driver's license and quizzed the minor about its
contents. Nevertheless, defendant directed an employee to sell the video to the minor. See
Haltom, 2005 UT App 348,ffi[2-5, 12 & 22-23; affd, 2007 UT 22,ffif3-5 {Add. E).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant claims that the crime he was convicted of in 2004, dealing in material
harmful to a minor, was repealed in 2007 when the Utah Legislature changed a preposition
in the definition of the phrase "harmful to minors." Defendant asserts that this "repeal"
mandates reduction of his felony conviction to a class A misdemeanor. No authority supports
defendant.
Utah has long recognized that a subsequent amendment of a criminal statute does not
affect a prior final criminal judgment. Consequently, even if a repeal occurred in 2007, that
statutory change would not affect defendant's 2004 conviction.
But a repeal did not occur. At most, the 2007 amendment to the definition of
"harmful to minors" limits what material may now be prosecuted under the dealing in
material harmful to a minor statute. It is more likely, however, that the change from "of to

8

"with" in the definition is simply a grammatical mistake. Indeed, the definition is slated for
correction in the next legislative session. But regardless of whether the amendment is a
repeal or a mistake, the change does not compel reduction of defendant's conviction in the
interest of justice. Consequently, the trial court properly exercised its discretion in finding
that the 2007 amendment did not justify a "different result" in defendant's 2004 conviction.
ARGUMENT4
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXERCISED ITS DISCRETION IN
FINDING THAT A 2007 STATUTORY AMENDMENT DOES NOT
IUSTIFY
REDUCTION
OF DEFENDANT'S
2004
FELONY
CONVICTION
Defendant was convicted of dealing in material harmful to a minor in violation of
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1206 (2004). At the time of defendant's crime in 2000, his trial in
2003, and his conviction in 2004, section 76-10-1206(1) read:
A person is guilty of dealing in material harmful to minors when, knowing that
a person is a minor, or having failed to exercise reasonable care in ascertaining
the proper age of the minor, he . . . intentionally distributes . . . to a minor any
material harmful to minors.
See Add. A for complete text of 2004 statute. The phrase "harmful to minors" was defined
in another statute, Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1201(4) (West 2004), which, at the time, read:
"Harmful to minors" means that quality of any description or representation,
in whatsoever form, of nudity, sexual conduct, sexual excitement, or
sadomasochistic abuse when it:
(a) taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest in sex of minors;

4

The State addressed defendant's Point I (standard of review) in footnote 1, supra
at 2. The argument portion of this brief addresses defendant's Point II.
9

(b) is patently offensive to prevailing standards in the adult community
as a whole with respect to what is suitable material for minors, and
(c) taken as a whole, does not have serious value for minors. Serious
value includes only serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value
for minors.
See Add. A for complete text of 2004 statute.
At trial, defendant conceded that he knew that the video sold to the minor was
"harmful to minors" and, therefore, its sale to a minor was legally prohibited (R674: 30-31;
R677: 211-13, 237). He claimed, however, that he should not be held criminally liable for
the illegal sale because he was not at fault in not ascertaining the minor's true age (R677:
224-27, 245-46). See also Haltom, 2005 UT App 348, \ 12 (Add E). The jury rejected
defendant's claim and convicted him of the illegal sale (R. 431; R679: 308). On appeal, this
Court and the Utah Supreme Court interpreted the intent elements of section 76-10-1206(1)
and held that the phrase, "having failed to exercise reasonable care in ascertaining the proper
age of the a minor" properly required only that defendant negligently failed to ascertain the
minor's age.5 See Haltom, 2005 UT App 348,ffif19-20, aff'd, 2007 UT 22,ffij6-9 (Add E).
In 2007, the Utah Legislature amended section 76-10-1206(1) to explicitly reflect the
negligence standard recognized in Haltom. The section now reads:
A person is guilty of dealing in material harmful to minors when . .. having
negligently failed to determine the proper age of a minor, the person . . .
intentionally distributes . . . any material harmful to minors.

5

The statute also requires that defendant intentionally sell the video knowing the
nature of its contents. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1206 (Add. A). These elements were
never disputed.
10

(Emphasis added). See Add. A for complete text of 2007 statute. This amendment is not at
issue here.
At the same time, the legislature amended the definition of "harmful to minors" in
former section 76-10-1201(4) by changing the preposition " o f to "with" and making other
stylistic changes. The definition now reads:
"Harmful to minors" means that quality of any description or representation,
in whatsoever form, of nudity, sexual conduct, sexual excitement, or
sadomasochistic abuse when it:
(I) taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest in sex with minors;
(ii) is patently offensive to prevailing standards in the adult community
as a whole with respect to what is suitable material for minors; and
(iii) taken as a whole, does not have serious literary, artistic, political
or scientific value for minors.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1201 (5)(a) (West Supp. 2007) (emphasis added) (Add A). It is this
prepositional change which defendant claims repealed his underlying crime and justifies
reduction of his offense. See Brief of Appellant [Br.Aplt.] at 18-20, 23-24.
This Court need not determine the meaning of the 2007 legislative amendment,
because whatever the current definition of "harmful to minors," any change in 2007 does not
affect the validity or degree of defendant's 2004 conviction.
Utah has long-recognized that a subsequent repeal of a statute does not affect a prior
final judgment. This principle is incorporated into statute.
The repeal of a statute does not revive a statute previously repealed, or affect
any right which has accrued, any duty imposed, any penalty incurred, or any
action or proceeding commenced under or by virtue of the statute repealed.

11

Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-5 (West 2004) (Add. A). Utah courts have consistently recognized
that this savings clause bars modification of a prior final judgment based on a subsequent
statutory amendment. See State v. Miller, 464 P.2d 844, 846 (Utah 1970) (holding that
section 68-3-5 prevents modification of a final sentence based on a subsequent legislative
change in penalty); Salina City v. Lewis, 172 P. 286, 290 (Utah 1918) (holding that a final
criminal judgment cannot be modified by a subsequent amendment of the criminal statute);
Pleasant Grove City v. Lindsay, 125 P. 389, 391-92 (Utah 1912) (recognizing that an
identically-worded prior savings clause barred modification of a prior judgment based on a
change in the law, but holding that the provision did not apply to municipal ordinances). See
also State v. Tapp, 490 P.2d 334,394 (Utah 1971) (holding that a defendant is entitled to the
benefit of a statutory amendment only z/the amendment is enacted prior to final judgment);
Belt v. Turner, 483 P.2d 425, 425-26 (Utah 1971) (same); State v. Patience, 944 P.2d
381,385-86 (Utah App. 1997) (same).
Indeed, defendant concedes that "a favorable change in the law after sentence has
been pronounced does not act to vacate the judgment or sentence." Br.Aplt. at 24.
Defendant, therefore, "only asks that the equities of this situation be considered in reviewing
his Motion to Reduce." Id. Here, the trial court considered the "equities" defendant argued,
but then properly found that they did not justify reduction.
As justification for his third 402 motion, defendant argued that the 2007 amendment
to section 76-10-1201(4) repealed section 76-10-1206(1) (R. 3 97 :R903:1). The prosecutor

12

disagreed. The prosecutor explained that, at most, the legislature simply changed the
definition of what constituted material "harmful to minors" (R. 861; R903: 2-4). The
amendment to section 76-10-1201 occurred in House Bill 5 [H.B. 5], a 24-page bill which
extensively amended various provisions in Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 12, concerning minors'
access to pornography and other harmful materials (R. 797, 801, 862; R903: 2-4). See also
Enrolled Copy, House Bill 5, 2007 General Session of the Utah State Legislature,
http://www.le.state.ut.us. The intent behind H.B. 5 was to strengthen laws barring the
dissemination of these materials to Utah youth. See Representative Paul Ray, Floor Debate
on H.B. 5,2007 Utah Legislature, Gen. Sess. (January 16, 2007), http://www.le.state.ut.us.
The other provisions of the bill support this intent. See H.B. 5, id.
Admittedly, the change in section 76-10-1201 created a possible ambiguity. See Li
v. Zhang, 2005 UT App 246, \ 8, 120 P.3d 30 (recognizing that if two "reasonable, yet
conflicting" interpretations can be "gleaned from the plain language of a statute,"the statute
is ambiguous), affd, 2006 UT 80, 150 P.3d 471. According to defendant, the phrase
"appeals to the prurient interest in sex with minors" necessarily limits prosecution to
materials depicting minors having sex, i.e., child pornography (R. 801-02). The prosecutor
argued that defendant's interpretation would allow minors to have greater access to sexuallyexplicit materials and, therefore, would be inconsistent with the purpose of H.B. 5 and the
other provisions in Title 76, Chapter 10 (R. 861-862; R903: 2). See Sachs v. Lesser, 2007
UT App 169, *[f 37,163 P.3d 662 (reaffirming that in interpreting a statute, the "primary goal

13

. . . is to give effect to the legislative intent, as evidenced by the plain language, in light of
the purpose the statute was meant to achieve . . . [and] in harmony with other statutes in the
same chapter and related chapters"), cert, granted, 168 P.3d 1264 (Utah 2007); Hansen v.
Eyre, 2003 UT App 274, \ 7,74 P.3d 1182 (reaffirming that statutes that are "inpari materia.
. . . must be construed together when they relate to the same . .. class of persons or things,
or have the same purpose or object"), affd, 2005 UT 79,116 P.3d 290. Consequently, rather
than a repeal, the change of preposition appeared to be a grammatical mistake, which,
according to the prosecutor, was slated for remedy in the next legislative session (R. 861-62;
R903:2-4).6
But regardless of whether the amendment is a repeal or mistake, the change does not
compel reductio of defendant's conviction in the interest ofjustice. The trial court heard oral
argument and "review[ed] the [parties'] briefs and supporting authority" before ruling (R.
866; R903: 1-4). The court then explained that it was not "persuaded that the Legislative
revisions to the definition of material 'harmful to minors' require[d] a different result" in
defendant's conviction and "therefore [the court was] not inclined in its discretionary powers
to reduce the degree of the offense" (R. 886) (Add. D). In sum, the trial court did what

6

The prosecutor cited to the legislative web site list of bills, which at that time,
apparently listed the intended bill (R. 862). A current (December 2007) check of the web
site does not list the proposed amendment; however, not all 2008 bills are yet listed. In
any case, as discussed supra at 11, the current or future definition of "harmful to minors"
is not determinative of this appeal.
14

defendant seeks on appeal: it considered the equities defendant argued.

The trial court

simply disagreed with defendant that those "equities" justified reduction of his conviction.
* * *

The legislature in 2007 did not repeal the crime of dealing in material harmful to a
minor in section 76-10-1206. At most, they narrowed the definition of "harmful" material
in section 76-10-1201. More likely, the legislature made a grammatical mistake. In either
case, the 2007 amendment only affects prosecutions commenced after its enactment. It
cannot affect defendant's 2003 prosecution or his 2004 penalty. See Utah Code Ann. § 68-35. Because no reduction of defendant's conviction was mandated, the trial court was free to
exercise its discretion and deny defendant's third 402 motion.
CONCLUSION
The trial court's order denying defendant's motion to reduce the degree of felony
conviction should be affirmed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / ^

day of December, 2007.

MARKL. SHURTLEFF
Attorney GeneraL

CHRISTINE F. SOLTIS
Assistant Attorney General
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Addenda

Addendum A

(West 2004)
§ 6 8 - 3 - 5 . Effect of repeal
The repeal of a statute does not revive a statute previously repealed, or affect
any right which has accrued, any duty imposed, any penalty incurred, or any
action or proceeding commenced under or by virtue of the statute repealed.
Codifications R.S. 1898, § 2492; C.L. 1907, § 2492; C.L. 1917, § 5842; R.S 1933, § 88-2-5; C.
1943, § 88-2-5.

(West Supp. 2007)
§ 76-3-402.

Conviction of lower degree of offense—Procedure and limitations

(1) If at the time of sentencing the court, having regard to the nature and circumstances of
the offense of which the defendant was found guilty and to the history and character of the
defendant, and after having given any victims present at the sentencing and the prosecuting
attorney an opportunity to be heard, concludes it would be unduly harsh to record the
conviction as being for that degree of offense established by statute, the court may enter a
judgment of conviction for the next lower degree of offense and impose sentence accordingly.
(2) If the court suspends the execution of the sentence and places the defendant on
probation, whether or not the defendant is committed to jail as a condition of probation, the
court may enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower degree of offense:
(a) after the defendant has been successfully discharged from probation;
(b) upon motion and notice to the prosecuting attorney;
(c) after reasonable effort has been made by the prosecuting attorney to provide notice
to any victims;
(d) after a hearing if requested by either party under Subsection (2)(c); and
(e) if the court finds entering a judgment of conviction for the next lower degree of
offense is in the interest of justice.
(3)(a) An offense may be reduced only one degree under this section, whether the reduction
is entered under Subsection (1) or (2), unless the prosecutor specifically agrees in writing or
on the court record that the offense may be reduced two degrees.
(b) In no case may an offense be reduced under this section by more than two degrees.
(4) This section does not preclude any person from obtaining or being granted an
expungement of his record as provided by law.
(5) The court may not enter judgment for a conviction for a lower degree of offense if:
(a) the reduction is specifically precluded by law; or
(b) if any unpaid balance remains on court ordered restitution for the offense for which
the reduction is sought.
(6) When the court enters judgment for a lower degree of offense under this section, the
actual title of the offense for which the reduction is made may not be altered.
(7)(a) A person may not obtain a reduction under this section of a conviction that requires
the person to register as a sex offender until the registration requirements under Section
77-27-21.5 have expired.
(b) A person required to register as a sex offender for the person's lifetime under
Subsection 77-27-21.5(10)(c) may not be granted a reduction of the conviction for the
offense or offenses that require the person to register as a sex offender.
(8) As used in this section, "next lower degree of offense" includes an offense regarding
which:
(a) a statutory enhancement is charged in the information or indictment that would
increase either the maximum or the minimum sentence; and
(b) the court removes the statutory enhancement pursuant to this section.
Laws 1973, c. 196, § 76-8-402; Laws 1983, c. 88, § 6; Laws 1991, c. 7, § 1, Laws 2006, c 50, § 1, eff.
May 1, 2006; Laws 2006, c. 189, § 6, eff. July 1, 2006; Laws 2007, c. 103, § 1, eff. April 30, 2007.

(West 2004)
§ 76-10-1201.

Definitions

For the purpose of this part:
(1) "Contemporary community standards'' means those current standards in
the vicinage where an offense alleged under this act has occurred, is occurring,
or will occur.
(2) "Distribute" means to transfer possession of materials whether with or
without consideration.
(3) "Exhibit" means to show.
(4) "Harmful to minors" means that quality of any description or representation, in whatsoever form, of nudity, sexual conduct, sexual excitement, or
sadomasochistic abuse when it:
(a) taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest in sex of minors;
(b) is patently offensive to prevailing standards in the adult community as
a whole with respect to what is suitable material for minors; and
(c) taken as a whole, does not have serious value for minors. Serious
value includes only serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value for
minors.
(5) "Knowingly" means an awareness, whether actual or constructive, of the
character of material or of a performance. A person has constructive knowledge if a reasonable inspection or observation under the circumstances would
have disclosed the nature of the subject matter and if a failure to inspect or
observe is either for the purpose of avoiding the disclosure or is criminally
negligent.
(6) "Material" means anything printed or written or any picture, drawing,
photograph, motion picture, or pictorial representation, or any statue or other
figure, or any recording or transcription, or a&y mechanical, chemical, or
electrical reproduction, or anything which is or may be used as a means of
communication. Material includes undeveloped photographs, molds, printing
plates, and other latent representational objects.
(7) "Minor" means any person less than eighteen years of age.
(8) "Nudity" means die showing of the human male or female genitals, pubic
area, or buttocks, with less than an opaque covering, or the showing of a female
breast with less than an opaque covering, or any portion thereof below the top
of the nipple, or the depiction of covered male genitals in a discemibly turgid
state.
(9) "Performance" means any physical human bodily activity, whether engaged in alone or with other persons, including but not limited to singing,
speaking, dancing, acting, simulating, or pantomiming.
(10) "Public place" includes a place to which admission is gained by payment of a membership or admission fee, however designated, notwithstanding
its being designated a private club or by words of like import.

(11) "Sado-masochistic abuse" means flagellation or torture by or upon a
person who is nude or clad in undergarments, a mask, or in a revealing or
bizarre costume, or the condition of being fettered, bound, or otherwise
physically restrained on the part of one so clothed.
(12) "Sexual conduct" means acts of masturbation, sexual intercourse, or
any touching of a person's clothed or unclothed genitals, pubic area, buttocks,
or, if the person is a female, breast, whether alone or between members of the
same or opposite sex or between humans and animals in an act of apparent or
actual sexual stimulation or gratification.
(13) "Sexual excitement" means a condition of human male or female
genitals when in a state of sexual stimulation or arousal, or the sensual
experiences of humans engaging in or witnessing sexual conduct or nudity.
Laws 1975, c. 49, § 3; Laws 1977, c. 92, § 3; Laws 2001, c. 9, § 116, eff. April 30,
2001.

(West Supp. 2007)
§ 76-10-1201.

Definitions

For the purpose of this part:
(1) "Blinder rack" means an opaque cover that covers the lower 2/3 of a material so that
the lower 2/3 of the material is concealed from view.
(2) "Contemporary community standards" means those current standards in the vicinage
where an offense alleged under this part has occurred, is occurring, or will occur.
(3) "Distribute" means to transfer possession of materials whether with or without consideration.
(4) "Exhibit" means to show.
(5)(a) "Harmful to minors" means that quality of any description or representation, in
whatsoever form, of nudity, sexual conduct, sexual excitement, or sadomasochistic abuse when
it:
(i) taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest in sex with minors;
(ii) is patently offensive to prevailing standards in the adult community as a whole with
respect to what is suitable material for minors; and
(iii) taken as a whole, does not have serious value for minors,
(b) Serious value includes only serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value for
minors.
(6) "Knowingly" means an awareness, whether actual or constructive, of the character of
material or of a performance. A person has constructive knowledge if a reasonable inspection
or observation under the circumstances would have disclosed the nature of the subject matter
and if a failure to inspect or observe is either for the purpose of avoiding the disclosure or is
criminally negligent as described in Section 76-2-103.
(7) "Material" means anything printed or written or any picture, drawing, photograph,
motion picture, or pictorial representation, or any statue or other figure, or any recording or /
transcription, or any mechanical, chemical, or electrical reproduction, or anything which is or
may be used as a means of communication. Material includes undeveloped photographs,
molds, printing plates, and other latent representational objects.
(8) "Minor" means any person less than 18 years of age.
(9) "Negligently" means simple negligence, the failure to exercise that degree of care that
a reasonable and prudent person would exercise under like or similar circumstances.
(10) "Nudity" means:
(a) the showing of the human male or female genitals, pubic area, or buttocks, with less
than an opaque covering;
(b) the showing of a female breast with less than an opaque covering, or any portion of
the female breast below the top of the areola; or
(c) the depiction of covered male genitals in a discernibly turgid state.
(11) "Performance" means any physical human bodily activity, whether engaged in alone or
with other persons, including singing, speaking, dancing, acting, simulating, or pantomiming.
(12) "Public place" includes a place to which admission is gained by payment of a
membership or admission fee, however designated, notwithstanding its being designated a
private club or by words of like import.
(13) "Sado-masochistic abuse" means:
(a) flagellation or torture by or upon a person who is nude or clad in undergarments, a
mask, or In a revealing or bizarre costume; or
(b) the condition of being fettered, bound, or otherwise physically restrained on the part
of a person clothed as described in Subsection (13)(a).
(14) "Sexual conduct" means acts of masturbation, sexual intercourse, or any touching of a
person's clothed or unclothed genitals, pubic area, buttocks, or, if the person is a female,
breast, whether alone or between members of the same or opposite sex or between humans
and animals in an act of apparent or actual sexual stimulation or gratification.
(15) "Sexual excitement" means a condition of human male or female genitals when in a
state of sexual stimulation or arousal, or the sensual experiences of humans engaging in or
witnessing sexual conduct or nudity.
Laws 1975, c. 49, § 3; Laws 1977, c. 92, § 3; Laws 2001, c. 9, § 116, eff April 30, 2001; Laws 2007, c.
123, § 1, eff. April 30, 2007; Laws 2007, c. 337, § 2, eff. Mar. 19, 2007.

(West 2004)
§ 7 6 - 1 0 - 1 2 0 6 . Dealing in material harmful to a minor
(1) A person is guilty of dealing in material harmful to minors when,
knowing that a person is a minor, or having failed to exercise reasonable care
in ascertaining the proper age of a minor, he:
(a) intentionally distributes or offers to distribute, exhibits or offers to
exhibit to a minor any material harmful to minors;
(b) intentionally produces, presents, or directs any performance before a
minor, that is harmful to minors; or
(c) intentionally participates in any performance before a minor, that is
harmful to minors.
(2) Each separate offense under this section is a third degree felony punishable by a minimum mandatory fine of not less than $300 plus $10 for each
article exhibited up to the maximum allowed by law and by incarceration,
without suspension of sentence in any way, for a term of not less than 14 days.
This section supersedes Section 77-18-1.
(3) If a defendant has already been convicted once under this section, each
separate further offense is a second degree felony punishable by a minimum
mandatory fine of not less than $5,000 plus $10 for each article exhibited up to
the maximum allowed by law and by incarceration, without suspension of
sentence in any way, for a term of not less than one year. This section
supersedes Section 77-18-1.
Laws 1973, c. 196, § 76-10-1206; Laws 1975, c. 49, § 6; Laws 1989, c. 187, § 8; Laws
1990, c. 163, §§ 10, 11; Laws 1997, c. 164, § 1, eff. May 5, 1997; Laws 2000, c. 53, § 1,
eff. May 1, 2000.

(West Supp. 2007)
§ 76-10-1206. Dealing: in material harmful to a minor—Exemptions for Internet s e n d e e providers a n d h o s t i n g c o m p a n i e s
(1) A person is guilty of dealing in material harmful to minors when, knowing that a person
is a minor, or having negligently failed to determine the proper age of a minor, the person:
(a) intentionally distributes or offers to distribute, exhibits or offers to exhibit to a minor
any material harmful to minors;
(b) intentionally produces, presents, or directs any performance before a minor, that is
harmful to minors; or
(c) intentionally participates in any performance before a minor, that is harmful to
minors.
(2)(a) Each separate offense under this section is a third degree felony punishable by:
(i) a minimum mandatory fine of not less than $1,000 plus $10 for each article
exhibited up to the maximum allowed by law; and
(ii) incarceration, without suspension of sentence, for a term of not less than 14 days.
(b) This section supersedes Section 77-18-1.
(3)(a) If a defendant has already been convicted once under this section, each separate
further offense is a second degree felony punishable by:
(i) a minimum mandatory fine of not less than $5,000 plus $10 for each article
exhibited up to the maximum allowed by law; and
(ii) incarceration, without suspension of sentence, for a term of not less than one year.
(b) This section supersedes Section 77-18-1.
(c)(i) This section does not apply to an Internet service provider, as defined in Section
76-10-1230, if:
(A) the distribution of pornographic material by the Internet service provider occurs
only incidentally through the Internet service provider's function of:
(I) transmitting or routing data from one person to another person; or
(II) providing a connection between one person and another person;
(B) the Internet service provider does not intentionally aid or abet in the distribution of the pornographic material; and
(C) the Internet service provider does not knowingly^ receive funds from or through
a person who distributes the pornographic material in* exchange for permitting the
person to distribute the pornographic material.
(ii) This section does not apply to a hosting company, as defined in Section 76-10-1230,
if:
(A) the distribution of pornographic material by the hosting company occurs only
incidentally through the hosting company's function of providing data storage space or
data caching to a person;
(B) the hosting company does not intentionally engage, aid, or abet in the distribution of the pornographic material; and
(C) the hosting company does not knowingly receive funds from or through a person
who distributes the pornographic material in exchange for permitting the person to
distribute, store, or cache the pornographic material.
(4)(a) A service provider, as defined m Section 76-10-1230, is not negligent under this
section if it complies with Section 76-10-1231.
(b) A content provider, as defined in Section 76-10-1230, is not negligent under this
section if it complies with Section 76-10-1233.
Laws 1973, c. 196, § 76-10-1206; Laws 1975, c. 49, § 6; Laws 1989, c. 187, § 8; Laws 1990, c. 163, §§ 10,
11; Laws 1997, c. 164, § 1, eff. May 5, 1997, Laws 2000, c. 53, § 1, eff. May 1, 2000; Laws 2005, c 281,
§ 5, eff. March 21, 2005; Laws 2007, c. 337, § 5, eff. Mar 19, 2007.
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 001913808
vs.
JOHN HALTOM,
Defendant.

Hearing
Electronically Recorded on
September 4, 2003

BEFORE:

THE HONORABLE DENNIS M. FUCHS
Third District Court Judge

For the Plaintiff:

T. Lanqdon Fisher
SL Cnty Dpty Dist Atty
231 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801)366-7859

For the Defendant:

W. Andrew McCuIlouqh
MCCULLOUGH & ASSOCIATES
895 W. C e n t e r S t .
Orem, UT 84057
FILED
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Transcribed by:
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PROVO, UTAH 84606
TELEPHONE: (8 01)377-0027
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Deputy Clerk

-111 I Mr. McCullough?
2 I
3

MR. MCCULLOUGH:
situation, your Honor.

4

THE COURT:

I think the Court's aware of the
I r 11 leave it to the Court.

Okay.

Well, in the first regard, the

5

Court is going to recall the warrant that they've launched

6

against Mr. Haltom, and I don't see any reason to interfere

7

with his ability to reach whatever status or level that he can

8

in Kansas.

9

I'm not looking to be punitive for those reasons.

Mr. Haltom has made all of his appearances.

I have no

10

doubt that he will make his appearances.

11

have to do is we'll set a date probably for sentencing, and

12

then if he gets out of jail earlier in Kansas, we'll set

13

some —

14

Court.

15

I guess what we'll

I'll issue some order in regards to your notifying the

In regards to the 402 motion, Mr. McCullough, I

16

understand your argument totally.

17

Mr. Haltom selling whatever he wants to sell personally, as

18

long as he does it within the law.

19

believers in the First Amendment, but when one pushes it, one

20

deals with the repercussions of what happens when one wants to

21

push that envelope to its ultimate.

22

I have no problem with

I think a lot of judges are

The legislature sets the laws in this State.

I take

23

an oath to follow the laws as passed by the legislature.

This

24

is one of those instances where they made the selling of

25

pornographic material or inappropriate material to a minor a

-121
2

felony.
This Court does not feel that I am in a position to

3

grant your 4 02 motion at this point.

4

of a jury of this crime.

5

this crime.

6

deals a lot, I think, with mitigating circumstances for

7

purposes of sentencing and not necessarily reduction to 402

8

or 402 reduction.

9

Mr. Haltom was convicted

The legislature set the penalty for

Your argument is a compelling argument, but it

—

I have made it a policy on the bench that I will not

10

restrict anybody from filing a 4 02 motion at the time that

11

their probation is concluded.

12

at this particular —

13

notification to the State so that they can make any objection

14

that they feel is appropriate at that time, if they feel that

15

an objection is appropriate.

16

I would encourage you to do that

on this particular case, just requiring

You know, as I say to you, Mr. Haltom is not

—

17

obviously this has nothing to do with this case because this

18

video went to a minor, but in regards to the other activities

19

that he conducts in his stores, it is not my standard, it is

20

a community standard, and the Court has to honor what that

21

community standard is, which is why it was set up that way, and

22

our community has made its decisions.

23

it's really something totally —

24

that necessarily, because it dealt with an under age individual

25

purchasing the video.

In regards to this case,

it really doesn't come down to

-13So I'm going to deny your motion at this time and tell

1
2

you to renew it at the time of the conclusion of his probation

3

if the conviction isn't thrown out before then.

4

who knows, but obviously I get the chance to sentence

5

Mr. Haltom before that occurs, and again, I would be happy to

6

entertain your arguments.

7

in regards to punishment, and the Court obviously will take

8

those all into consideration at the time that the sentence is

9

imposed.

10

You know,

They're all mitigating circumstances

But again, I'll deny your motion at this time.

will recall your warrant.

11

We don't have next year's calendar yet, do we?

12

COURT CLERK:

13

THE COURT:
be —

Monday, okay.

Let's just —

that would

does anyone have January of 2 004?

16
17

If we just pick a Monday in January

we'11 be okay.

14
15

I

COURT CLERK:

I'll get my book and then I can give you

a date.

18

THE COURT:

Okay.

Let's just give you a date in

19

January of 2 0 04 for sentencing, with the understanding that if

20

he's released earlier than that that you're under court order

21

to notify this Court within 72 hours of his return to the State

22

of Utah after his release from the Kansas authorities.

23

MR. MCCULLOUGH:

No problem.

We'd put a full ad in

24

the newspaper, your Honor, but we'll certainly notify the

25

Court.

-141 I

COURT CLERK:

2

THE COURT:

3

We could go January the 12th.

All right, January the 12th will be the

tentative date set for sentencing.

4

COURT CLERK:

At 8:30.

5

THE COURT:

6

MR. MCCULLOUGH:

7

THE COURT:

Okay?
Thank you, your Honor.

All right, and we 7 11 recall that warrant.

8

Do you want findings prepared on today's hearing?

9

think —

10

I don't know.

I mean I

My initial reaction is there is nothing

to appeal, it's totally within the Court's discretion, s o —

11

MR. MCCULLOUGH:

Well, it isn't totally within the

12

Court's discretion.

I certainly intend to add it to my appeal,

13

but I think that the Court —

14

record on the transcript.

15

THE COURT:

16

MR. MCCULLOUGH:

I think there's an adequate

That's fine.

Okay.

With due respect, your Honor, I have

17

great respect for this Court, and am not threatening when I say

18

appeal, but the Court is well aware of what my job is in this

19

case.

20

THE COURT:

I do recall that Mr. Haltom has his

21

rights.

22

do not take it personally.

23

things about me that I take it personally in the decision.

24

yours.

25

I would never expect to infringe upon those rights.
It's only when they write silly

Not

The court of appeals or the Supreme Court.
MR. MCCULLOUGH:

I

Okay.

Good.

Well, you can —

yeah,

-15you can have your feud with them and not me, your Honor. Thank
you.
THE COURT: You're welcome.
{Hearing concluded)

Addendum C

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
vs.

:

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER

:

CASE NO. 001913808

:

JOHN V. HALTOM,
Defendant.

:

Judge Randall N. Skanchy

:

The Court has before it defendant John Hal torn' s (Mef endant") Motion
and Memorandum in support of a reduction of the Judgment and Sentence to
a lower category of offense, from a third degree felony to a Class A
misdemeanor.

The matter was fully briefed by the parties, the State

objected thereto, and the matter was presented before the Court for oral
argument on Monday, March 26, 2 007.
Defendant was convicted in 2 0 03 of the crime of Distributing Harmful
Material to a Minor, a third degree felony.

On January 12, 2004, he was

sentenced to 0 to 5 years at the Utah State Prison, which was suspended,
and he was ordered probation for a period of 3 6 months, and to serve 3 0
days in the Salt Lake County jail.

Pursuant to Section 76-3-402 of the

Utah Code Ann., defendant, at the termination of his probation, has
requested this Court exercise its discretion to reduce his conviction one
level, from a third degree felony to a Class A misdemeanor.

Having

reviewed the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and

STATE V. HALTOM

PAGE 2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

character of the defendant, the Court does not conclude that it is unduly
harsh for his conviction to remain at the level of the degree of offense
established by the statute and therefore denies the Motion.
Dated this " ^ ^

day of March, 2007.

Addendum D

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
VS .

:

DECISION AND ORDER

:

CASE NO. 001913808

2

John Haltorn,
Defendant.

:

Judge Randall N. Skanchy

:

Defendant John Haltom, by and through his counsel of record, W.
Andrew McCullough, brought a Motion to Reduce Degree of Offense and
Motion Strike Evidentiary Hearing. The State appeared by and through
counsel, Lohra L. Miller and T. Langdon Fisher.
Having reviewed the briefs and the supporting authority, the
Court hereby grants the motion to Strike Evidentiary Hearing. The
Court hereby denies the Motion to Reduce Degree of Offense pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402 (2002), it not being persuaded that the
Legislative revisions to the definition of material "harmful to
minors'' require a different result. This Court is therefore not
inclined in its discretionary powers to reduce the degree of this
offense.

Dated this

l^~

day of June, 2007.

RANDALIJ N. S
DISTRICT COURT
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121 P.3d 42, 532 Utah Adv. Rep. 9, 2005 UT App 348
(Cite as: 121 P.3d 42)

State v. Haltom
Utah App.,2005.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
John Vonderhaar HALTOM, Defendant and
Appellant.
No. 20040031-CA.
Aug. 11,2005.
Background: Defendant was convicted by jury in
the Third District Court, Salt Lake Department,
Dennis M. Fuchs, J., of dealing in material harmful
to a minor, a third degree felony. Defendant
appealed.
Holdings: The Court of Appeals, Thorne, J., held
that:
(1) defendant failed to establish entrapment as a
matter of law, and
(2) sufficient
conviction.

evidence

supported

defendant's

Affirmed.
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Materiality required to reverse a criminal conviction
for destruction of evidence as a denial of due
process is more than evidentiary materiality;
evidence must be material in a constitutional sense.
U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 14.
[4] Criminal Law 110 €==>1134(3)
110 Criminal Law
110XXIV Review
110XXIV(L) Scope of Review in General
1 lOkl 134 Scope and Extent in General
HOkl 134(3) k. Questions Considered
in General. Most Cited Cases
Whether a statement is offered for the truth of the
matter asserted is a question of law, which an
appellate court reviews under a correction of error
standard. Rules of Evid., Rule 801(c).
[5] Criminal Law 110 €==>338(1)
110 Criminal Law
110XVII Evidence
110XV1I(D) Facts in Issue and Relevance
110k338 Relevancy in General
110k338(l) k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
Criminal Law 110 €=^1153(1)
110 Criminal Law
110XXIV Review
110XXIV(N) Discretion of Lower Court
HOkl 153 Reception and Admissibility of
Evidence; Witnesses
HOkl 153(1) k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
While relevant evidence is generally admissible, a
trial court has broad discretion to determine
whether proffered evidence is relevant, and an
appellate court will find error only if the trial court
has abused its discretion.
[6] Criminal Law 110 €^1144.13(2.1)
110 Criminal Law
© 2007 ThomsonAVest. No

110XXIV Review
110XXIV(M) Presumptions
110k 1144 Facts or Proceedings Not
Shown by Record
110k 1144.13 Sufficiency of Evidence
HOkl 144.13(2) Construction of
Evidence
HOkl 144.13(2.1) k. In General.
Most Cited Cases
When reviewing a claim of insufficiency of the
evidence, the evidence and all reasonable inferences
that may be drawn therefrom are viewed in the light
most favorable to the jury verdict.
[7] Criminal Law 110 €=^37(2.1)
110 Criminal Law
11011 Defenses in General
110k36.5
Official
Action,
Inaction,
Representation, Misconduct, or Bad Faith
110k3 7 Entrapment
110k3 7(2)
What
Constitutes
Entrapment
110k37(2.1) k. In General. Most
Cited Cases
State has never recognized a per se rule of
entrapment; instead, state has adopted an objective
standard through which all entrapment claims will
be examined, with the focus on whether the police
conduct created a substantial risk that a normal
law-abiding person would be induced to commit a
crime.
[8] Criminal Law 110 €==>37(2.1)
110 Criminal Law
11 Oil Defenses in General
110k36.5
Official
Action,
Inaction,
Representation, Misconduct, or Bad Faith
110k3 7 Entrapment
110k3 7(2)
What
Constitutes
Entrapment
110k37(2.1) k. In General. Most
Cited Cases
To determine whether an entrapment has occurred
fact finders are required to examine whether law
officers, or their agents, induced the commission of
an offense in order to obtain evidence by methods
creating a substantial risk that the offense would be
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committed by one not otherwise ready to commit it.
[9] Criminal Law 110 €==>37(6.1)
110 Criminal Law
11011 Defenses in General
110k36.5
Official
Action,
Inaction,
Representation, Misconduct, or Bad Faith
110k3 7 Entrapment
110k37(6)
Particular
Cases
and
Offenses
110k37(6.1) k. In General. Most
Cited Cases
Defendant, who was convicted in dealing in
material harmful to a minor, failed to establish
entrapment as a matter of law; although defendant
argued that he would not have sold adult video to
minor in absence of store employee's alleged
relationship with police officer who sent minor into
novelty store and who allegedly used employee as
police agent to induce defendant to sell video to
minor, evidence of employee's relationship with
state was insufficient to establish entrapment, since
defendant asked minor for her identification and
examined it, and once he did this, there was no
evidence that employee attempted to coerce
defendant to ignore her date of birth. U.C.A.1953,
76-10-1206(2004).
[10] Criminal Law 110 €=>419(2)
110 Criminal Law
110XVII Evidence
11 OXVII(N) Hearsay
110k419 Hearsay in General
110k419(2) k. Evidence as to Fact of
Making Declarations and Not as to Subject-Matter.
Most Cited Cases
If an out-of-court statement is offered simply to
prove that it was made, without regard to whether it
was true, such testimony is not proscribed by the
hearsay rule. Rules of Evid., Rule 801(c).
[11] Criminal Law 110 €==>1134(3)
110 Criminal Law
110XXIV Review
HOXXIV(L) Scope of Review in General
1 lOkl 134 Scope and Extent in General

HOkl 134(3) k. Questions Considered
in General. Most Cited Cases
To the extent that there is no factual dispute,
whether a statement is offered for the truth of the
matter asserted is a question of law, which an
appellate court reviews under a correction of error
standard. Rules of Evid., Rule 801(c).
[12] Criminal Law 110 €==>419(2)
110 Criminal Law
110XVII Evidence
11 OXVII(N) Hearsay
110k419 Hearsay in General
110k419(2) k. Evidence as to Fact of
Making Declarations and Not as to Subject-Matter.
Most Cited Cases
Trial court's suppression of portion of witness's
testimony as inadmissible hearsay was improper in
prosecution for dealing in material harmful to a
minor, where statements were not offered for truth
of matter asserted. Rules of Evid., Rule 801(c);
U.C.A.1953, 76-10-1206 (2004).
[13] Criminal Law 110 €=>H69.1(9)
110 Criminal Law
110XXIV Review
110XXIV(Q) Harmless and Reversible Error
1 lOkl 169 Admission of Evidence
HOkl 169.1 In General
HOkl 169.1(9) k. Hearsay. Most
Cited Cases
Trial court's error in suppressing portion of
witness's testimony as inadmissible hearsay was
harmless in prosecution in which defendant
presented entrapment claim as defense to charge of
dealing in material harmful to a minor; although
trial court disallowed defendant's attempt to use
own words of novelty store employee, who initially
checked minor's identification when she entered
store and permitted her to shop, to support
defendant's assertion that employee knew store
policy well enough to train others, defendant was
able to present other evidence of employee's role as
store's trainer. Rules of Evid., Rule 801(c);
U.C.A.1953, 76-10-1206.
[14] Criminal Law 110 €=>H65(1)
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110 Criminal Law
110XXIV Review
110XXIV(Q) Harmless and Reversible Error
1 lOkl 165 Prejudice to Defendant in
General
HOkl 165(1) k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
An appellate court does not upset a verdict of a jury
merely because some error or irregularity may have
occurred, but will do so only if it is something
substantial and prejudicial in the sense that there is
a reasonable likelihood that in its absence there
would have been a different result.
[15] Criminal Law 110 €=^1169.2(1)
110 Criminal Law
110XXIV Review
110XXIV(Q) Harmless and Reversible Error
HOkl 169 Admission of Evidence
HOkl 169.2 Curing Error by Facts
Established Otherwise
llOkl 169.2(1) k. In General. Most
Cited Cases
Where evidence is excluded by a trial court and the
substance of such evidence is later admitted through
some other means, any error which may have
resulted is cured.
[16] Infants 211 €=^20
211 Infants
21 III Protection
211k20 k. Criminal Prosecutions Under Laws
for Protection of Children. Most Cited Cases
Evidence of subsequent legislative changes to
format of driver licenses for minors was irrelevant
in prosecution for dealing in material harmful to a
minor; defendant's defense was never predicated on
claim that he was unfamiliar with format of state's
driver licenses, or that he was confused by minor's
identification in particular, and instead, defendant's
defense centered entirely upon his reliance on
novelty store's policy of precluding minors from
premises, his expectation that his employees would
not fail in enforcing the policy, and his claim that
police used store employee to entrap defendant.
Rules of Evid., Rule 401; U.C.A.1953, 76-10-1206.

[17] Statutes 361 €=>181(1)
361 Statutes
361VI Construction and Operation
361VI(A) General Rules of Construction
361kl80 Intention of Legislature
361kl81 In General
361kl81(l) k. In General. Most
Cited Cases
Statutes 361 €=>184
361 Statutes
361VI Construction and Operation
361VI(A) General Rules of Construction
361kl80 Intention of Legislature
36 Ik 184 k. Policy and Purpose of Act.
Most Cited Cases
Statutes 361 €==>188
361 Statutes
361VI Construction and Operation
361VI(A) General Rules of Construction
361kl87 Meaning of Language
361kl88 k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
When interpreting statutes, an appellate court's
primary goal is to evince the true intent and purpose
of the Legislature; to discover that intent, the
appellate court looks first to the plain language of
the statute.
[18] Statutes 361 €=>212.6
361 Statutes
361VI Construction and Operation
361VI(A) General Rules of Construction
361k212 Presumptions to Aid Construction
361k212.6 k. Words Used. Most Cited
Cases
When examining statutory language, an appellate
court assumes the legislature used each term
advisedly and in accordance with its ordinary
meaning.
[19] Statutes 361 €==>189
361 Statutes
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361VI Construction and Operation
361VI(A) General Rules of Construction
361kl87 Meaning of Language
361kl89 k. Literal and Grammatical
Interpretation. Most Cited Cases
Statutory words are read literally, unless such a
reading is unreasonably confused or inoperable.
[20] Statutes 361 €=>206
361 Statutes
361VI Construction and Operation
361VI(A) General Rules of Construction
361k204 Statute as a Whole, and Intrinsic
Aids to Construction
361k206 k. Giving Effect to Entire
Statute. Most Cited Cases
An appellate court avoids interpretations that will
render portions of a statute superfluous or
inoperative.
[21] Infants 211 €=>20
211 Infants
21 III Protection
211k20 k. Criminal Prosecutions Under Laws
for Protection of Children. Most Cited Cases
Sufficient
evidence
supported
defendant's
conviction for dealing in material harmful to a
minor; defendant, a part-owner of novelty store who
was convicted after he sold adult video to minor,
held minor's license and examined it to ensure that
it was authentic, and defendant read every line
material to ensuring authenticity except date of
birth, and thus, jury's decision that defendant's
behavior did not constitute "reasonable care" was
supported. U.C.A.1953, 76-10-1206.

sufficient evidence to uphold a conviction, an
appellate court does not sit as a second fact finder.
[23] Criminal Law 110 €=^1144.13(2.1)
110 Criminal Law
110XXIV Review
110XXIV(M) Presumptions
1 lOkl 144 Facts or Proceedings Not
Shown by Record
HOkl 144.13 Sufficiency of Evidence
1 lOkl 144.13(2) Construction of
Evidence
HOkl 144.13(2.1) k. In General.
Most Cited Cases
Criminal Law 110 €==>1144.13(5)
110 Criminal Law
110XXIV Review
110XXIV(M) Presumptions
110k 1144 Facts or Proceedings Not
Shown by Record
1 lOkl 144.13 Sufficiency of Evidence
HOkl 144.13(5) k. Inferences or
Deductions from Evidence. Most Cited Cases
When reviewing a claim of insufficiency of the
evidence, the evidence and all inferences that may
be drawn therefrom are viewed in the light most
favorable to the jury verdict.
*45 W. Andrew McCullough, McCullough &
Associates, Midvale, for Appellant.
Mark L. Shurtleff, Attorney General, and Christine
F. Soltis, Assistant Attorney General, Salt Lake
City, for Appellee.

[22] Criminai Law 110 €=^1159.2(1)

Before Judges BILLINGS, BENCH, and THORNE.

110 Criminal Law
110XXIV Review
HOXXIV(P) Verdicts
HOkl 159 Conclusiveness of Verdict
HOkl 159.2 Weight of Evidence in
General
HOkl 159.2(1) k. In General. Most
Cited Cases
In making the determination as to whether there is

OPINION
THORNE, Judge:
|
1 John Vonderhaar Haltom appeals his
conviction for dealing in material harmful to a
minor, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah
Code section 76-10-1206 (2000). We affirm.

BACKGROUND
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1f 2 On August 4, 2000, just a few days after Dr.
John's Lingerie and Novelty store (Dr. John's)
opened for business, police in Midvale, Utah, sent
BP, a seventeen-year-old girl, into the store to
attempt to buy an adult film. She entered the store
and was soon thereafter approached by Vadim
Saprgeuldiev (Vadim), who asked to see her
identification. BP gave Vadim, who was an
employee of Dr. John's but not actually on duty
when BP entered, her driver license. He glanced at
it and then gave it back and permitted her to shop.
After wandering around the store for a few minutes,
BP went to the adult video rack where she chose
one at random and then went to the counter to make
the purchase. As she shopped, Vadim called
Haltom, a part owner of Dr. John's, to the counter
and asked him how one could determine whether a
license was authentic. Haltom informed Vadim
that if BP attempted to purchase an adult video, he
would show him. As BP approached the counter,
Haltom asked her for her identification and she
again produced her driver license.
If 3 Haltom took the license and examined it.
Among the relevant information contained on the
license were BP's photo, name, address, social
security number, and her date of birth, which clearly
showed that BP was born in December 1982 and
was therefore just seventeen years old at the time.
Haltom carefully compared BP to the photo and
then asked her to recite her social security
number-printed next to her date of birth-and her
address. When she gave an address with a street
name rather than coordinates, Haltom became
concerned and asked her to clarify her answer. She
responded with the proper coordinate address,
which corresponded with the address on the license,
and Haltom handed back the license. Vadim then
asked Haltom if he could sell the video to BP and
Haltom answered "What's the problem? It's her
I.D. [and] she's eighteen, right?" Vadim completed
the sale as Haltom was talking with BP and she left
the store.
If 4 Soon thereafter, BP returned to the store with
Detective Brimley, the Midvale City Police officer
who had sent her into Dr. John's. Brimley
informed Haltom that he had sold an adult video to
a minor-BP-and BP identified Vadim and Haltom as

the people she had dealt with during the transaction.
Haltom was arrested for dealing with material
harmful to a minor, in violation of Utah Code
section 76-10-1206 (2000).
1f 5 Prior to trial, Haltom petitioned to have the
charges dismissed because, he argued, he had been
entrapped as a matter of law. The State responded
and a hearing was scheduled, during which Haltom
presented just one witness-Curtis Gorman, a former
employee who had been fired for stealing from
Haltom and who had been referred to the Midvale
Police Department by Haltom for that theft.
Haltom argued that Brimley had established a
relationship with Vadim, and that Brimley had used
Vadim as a police agent to induce Haltom to sell the
video to BP. Through Gorman's testimony, Haltom
introduced evidence that Brimley was interested in
subverting a Dr. John's employee, and that, at
Brimley's urging, Gorman had *46 talked with
Vadim about meeting with Brimley. But, Gorman
never again met with Brimley and he had no idea
whether Brimley had been able to talk with Vadim,
or if, assuming such an encounter occurred, Vadim
had agreed to work with Brimley. Consequently,
the trial court denied Haltom's motion, but informed
all parties that Haltom wrould be given the
opportunity to present his entrapment claim to the
jury as a factual defense to the charge.
Tf 6 The case was subsequently tried in front of a
jury, which convicted Haltom. Haltom filed a
post-trial motion to arrest the judgment, which the
trial court denied, and he was sentenced to a
statutory term of imprisonment of zero to five years
in prison. The trial court, however, suspended all
but thirty days of that time and placed Haltom on
probation. Haltom now appeals.
ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW ™l
FN1. Although on appeal Haltom argues
that his due process rights were violated
when Brimley erased the audio tape made
during his interview with Gorman, he
failed to preserve this argument below.
See State v. Dean, 2004 UT 63, 1f 13, 95
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P.3d 276 (stating "appellate courts will not
consider an issue, including constitutional
arguments, raised for the first time on
appeal unless the trial court committed
plain error or the case involves exceptional
circumstances"); see also State v. Irwin,
924 P.2d 5, 7-8 (Utah CtApp. 1996). Had
Haltom preserved this issue "[t]he
materiality required to reverse a criminal
conviction for ... destruction of evidence as
a denial of due process is more than
evidentiary materiality." State v. Nebeker,
657 P.2d 1359, 1363 (Utah 1983). "The
evidence
must be material
in a
constitutional sense." State v. Humphrey,
793 P.2d 918, 926 (Utah Ct.App.1990).
To meet this threshold, Haltom must show
that the " 'evidence is vital to the issues of
whether [he] is guilty of the charge and
whether there is a fundamental unfairness
that requires the Court to set aside [his]
conviction.' "Id. (quoting State v. Lovato,
702 P.2d 101, 106 (Utah 1985)). Haltom
does not meaningfully assert that anything
on the destroyed tape satisfies this burden,
and in fact, Gorman's version of the taped
interview largely agreed with Brimley's
version. Thus, it is questionable whether
Haltom would have been able to
demonstrate harm resulting from the
destruction of the tape. Nevertheless,
because he failed to preserve this issue in
the trial court, we will not address the
substance of the argument here.
[1][2][3] 1f 7 Haltom argues that the trial court
erred in concluding that he had not been entrapped
as a matter of law. The trial court's decision
presents a mixed question of fact and law. See
State v. Beddoes, 890 P.2d 1, 3 (Utah Ct.App.1995)
Although we review factual findings for clear
error and legal conclusions for correctness, due to
the factually sensitive nature of entrapment cases
we will affirm the trial court's decision "unless we
can hold, based on the given facts, that reasonable
minds cannot differ as to whether entrapment
occurred." Id. Only when reasonable minds could
not differ can we find entrapment as a matter of law.
See id.

[4] \ 8 Haltom next argues that the trial court erred
in concluding that certain testimony was
inadmissible hearsay. "Whether a statement is
offered for the truth of the matter asserted is a
question of law, which we review under a correction
of error standard." State v. Perez, 924 P.2d 1, 2-3
(Utah CtApp. 1996).
[5] If 9 Haltom also argues that the trial court's
decision on the relevance of certain statutory
changes to the format of minors' driver licenses was
incorrect. "While relevant evidence is generally
admissible, a trial court has broad discretion to
determine whether proffered evidence is relevant,
and we will find error ... only if the trial court has
abused its discretion." State v. Harrison, 805 P.2d
769, 780 (Utah CtApp. 1991) (citation omitted).
[6] \ 10 Finally, Haltom argues that the evidence
was insufficient to support his conviction both as a
matter of law and of fact. Haltom's argument falls
into two categories. First, he asserts that his
activities did not constitute a violation of section
76-10-1206 as a matter of law, which under these
circumstances presents a question of statutory
interpretation that we review for correctness. See
State v. Bluff, 2002 UT 66, K 37, 52 P.3d 1210.
Second, he asserts that the evidence was not
sufficient to support the jury's verdict. "[W]hen
reviewing a claim of insufficiency of the evidence,
the evidence and all reasonable inferences that may
be drawn therefrom are viewed in the light most
favorable to the jury verdict." State v. Warden, 813
P.2dll46, 1150 (Utah 1991).
*47 ANALYSIS
[7] [8] f 11 Haltom first argues that the trial court
erred in failing to dismiss the complaint because he
was entrapped as a matter of law. "Utah has never
recognized a per se rule of entrapment." State v.
Beddoes, 890 P.2d 1, 3 (Utah CtApp. 1995).
Instead, Utah has adopted an objective standard
through which all entrapment claims will be
examined, with the focus on whether the police
conduct created "a substantial risk that a normal
law-abiding person would be induced to commit a
crime." State v. Martinez, 848 P.2d 702, 706 (Utah
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Ct.App.1993); see also State v. Taylor, 599 P.2d
496, 500 (Utah 1979) (stating that the objective
view asks whether "the conduct of the government
comport[s] with a fair and honorable administration
of justice"). Under an objective standard, law
enforcement officials are not denied the use of
decoys. See Taylor, 599 P.2d at 500. Nor are
police prohibited from using people that a
defendant might consider to be a friend. See
Martinez, 848 P.2d at 707 (stating "the mere
existence of a personal relationship does not
establish entrapment"). Instead, the focus of our
objective test is on examining whether the
government conduct created or manufactured a
crime. See Taylor, 599 P.2d at 500-01 ("Nothing
can be more reprehensible than to induce the
commission of crime for the purpose of
apprehending and convicting the perpetrator."
(quotations and citation omitted)). Consequently,
to determine whether an entrapment has occurred
fact finders are required to examine whether law
officers, or their agents, induced "the commission
of an offense in order to obtain evidence ... by
methods creating a substantial risk that the offense
would be committed by one not otherwise ready to
commit it." Beddoes, 890 P.2d at 3 (alteration in
original) (quotations and citations omitted).
[9] 1f 12 Haltom argues that he would not have
sold an adult video to a minor in the absence of
Vadim's alleged relationship with Brimley.
However, at best, the evidence Haltom offered in
support of this assertion is subject to multiple
interpretations, ranging from the one offered by
Haltom-that Vadim became an agent of the State-to
the one offered by the State-that Vadim did nothing
to assist Brimley's crusade against Dr. John's.
Moreover, had the evidence of Vadim's relationship
with the State been less tenuous, this alone is still
insufficient to establish entrapment as a matter of
law. See id. (noting that exploitation of a
relationship is a necessary factor to meet the
requirements of entrapment). This is especially
true given Haltom's decision to ask BP for her
identification and examine it. Once he did this,
there is no evidence that Vadim attempted to coerce
or convince Haltom to ignore her date of birth, or
that Vadim told Haltom that he had already checked
the birthdate and that there was no need to do so
© 2007 Thomson/West. No

again. Rather than an issue that could be settled as
a matter of law, Haltom presented the trial court
with evidence that could have supported Haltom's
entrapment defense, but that also could have been
interpreted as insignificant. Consequently, because
reasonable minds easily could differ on the question
of entrapment as a matter of law in this case, the
trial court properly denied Haltom's motion.™2
See id.

FN2. Haltom presents no challenge to the
jury's refusal to accept his entrapment
defense as a matter of fact.
[10][11] 1f 13 Haltom next argues that the trial
court erred in suppressing a portion of Theresa
Ferrone's testimony as inadmissible hearsay. Rule
801(c) of the Utah Rules of Evidence defines
hearsay as "a statement, other than one made by the
declarant ..., offered in evidence to prove the truth
of the matter asserted." Utah R. Evid. 801(c). " '
[I]f an out-of-court statement is "offered simply to
prove that it was made, without regard to whether it
was true, such testimony is not proscribed by the
hearsay rule." ' "In re G.Y., 962 P.2d 78, 84 (Utah
Ct.App.1998) (quoting State v. Olsen, 860 P.2d
332, 335 (Utah 1993)). "To the extent that there is
no factual dispute, whether a statement is offered
for the truth of the matter asserted is a question of
law, which we review under a correction of error
standard." Id. (quotations, citation, and alteration
omitted).
*48 [12][13] H 14 Haltom argues that the trial
court erred in concluding that he was offering
Ferrone's testimony concerning a conversation with
Vadim for the truth of the matter asserted.
Specifically, Haltom suggests that Ferrone's
testimony was offered to bolster Haltom's claim that
Vadim was an expert in the store's policies and
accepted methods for identifying and excluding
minors from the premises. Assuming that Haltom's
version of the testimony is correct, we do not
believe that the statements were offered for the truth
of the matter asserted.FN3 In fact, the excluded
statement would have done nothing more than
support Haltom's claim that Vadim was the store
trainer and that he was quite aware of the store
to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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policy concerning the admission of minors.
FN3. During her direct examination,
Ferrone was asked if Vadim had provided
her with any instruction or training in
addition to that provided by Haltom. She
responded "Vadim just told me, you know,
you need to check every I.D ...." at which
point the State objected. The court
sustained the objection. The State offered
no reason for its objection, but the court
informed Haltom that "[a]ny hearsay is off.
[14][15] If 15 However, the trial court's erroneous
exclusion of Vadim's statements does not
necessarily require the reversal of Haltom's
conviction. " '[W]e do not upset the verdict of a
jury merely because some error or irregularity may
have occurred, but will do so only if it is something
substantial and prejudicial in the sense that there is
a reasonable likelihood that in its absence there
would have been a different result.' "State v.
Hutchison, 655 P.2d 635, 636 (Utah 1982) (quoting
State v. Urias, 609 P.2d 1326, 1329 (Utah 1980)). "
Where evidence is excluded by the trial court and
the substance of such evidence is later admitted
through some other means, any error which may
have resulted is cured." State v. Colwell, 2000 UT
8, \ 29, 994 P.2d 177. Here, although the trial
court disallowed Haltom's attempt to use Vadim's
own words to support Haltom's assertion that
Vadim knew the store policy well enough to train
others, Haltom was able to present other evidence
of Vadim's role as Dr. John's trainer. For instance,
Haltom's long-time employee Bonnie Bolton
testified that she was trained by Vadim on how to "
card" potential patrons to ensure that they were not
minors. During Haltom's testimony, he identified
Vadim as "a senior employee," one sufficiently
experienced to appear in the background of a Dr.
John's promotional video carding potential
customers. He further testified that he brought
Vadim in from Nebraska to train the Utah
employees and that Vadim was a trusted employee.
Thus, although the jury was not presented with
Vadim's statements, ample evidence of Vadim's
knowledge was presented to the jury through other

avenues. Thus, even though the trial court erred in
suppressing the statement, the error was not
harmful. See, e.g., State v. Blubaugh, 904 P.2d
688, 697-98 (Utah Ct.App.1995) (concluding that
trial court's error was harmless because sufficient
similar evidence was presented to the jury to render
the error harmless).
[16] H 16 Haltom also argues that the trial court
erred in denying his attempt to introduce subsequent
legislative changes to the format of driver licenses
for minors. "While relevant evidence is generally
admissible, a trial court has broad discretion to
determine whether proffered evidence is relevant,
and we will find error in a relevancy ruling only if
the trial court has abused its discretion." State v.
Harrison, 805 P.2d 769, 780 (Utah CtApp.1991)
(citation omitted). " 'Relevant evidence' means
evidence having any tendency to make the existence
of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less
probable than it would be without the evidence."
Utah R. Evid. 401; see also Colwell, 2000 UT 8 at
1127, 994 P.2d 177.
^ 17 The trial court in this instance did not exceed
the permitted range of its discretion. Haltom's
defense was never predicated on a claim that he was
unfamiliar with the format of Utah's driver licenses,
or that he was confused by BP's identification in
particular. Instead, his defense centered entirely
upon his reliance on Dr. John's policy of precluding
minors from the premises, his expectation that his
employees would not fail in enforcing the policy,
and his claim that the Midvale police used Vadim to
entrap Haltom. The subsequent legislative changes
to the *49 driver license format were irrelevant to
the defenses offered by Haltom, and therefore we
conclude that the trial court acted well within its
permitted range of discretion in refusing to allow
Haltom to introduce evidence of the changes.
f 18 Haltom's final and most forceful argument is
that the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law
to convict him of dealing in materials harmful to a
minor. More concisely, Haltom asserts that the
State failed to prove that he violated the statute
when he sold the video to BP. To address Haltom's
challenge properly, we must first determine the
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culpable mental state required to violate section
76-10-1206. Only after doing so can we examine
the merits of his argument.
[17][18][19][20] U 19Section 76-10-1206 states:
A person is guilty of dealing in material harmful to
minors when, knowing that a person is a minor, or
having failed to exercise reasonable care in
ascertaining the proper age of a minor, he:
(a) intentionally distributes or offers to distribute;
exhibits or offers to exhibit to a minor any material
harmful to minors.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1206(1) (2003) (emphasis
added). "When interpreting statutes, our primary
goal is to evince the true intent and purpose of the
Legislature." State v. Martinez, 2002 UT 80, \ 8,
52 P.3d 1276 (quotations and citations omitted). "
To discover that intent, we look first to the plain
language of the statute." State v. Bluff, 2002 UT
66, \ 34, 52 P.3d 1210 (quotations and citation
omitted). "When examining the statutory language
we assume the legislature used each term advisedly
and in accordance with its ordinary meaning."
Martinez, 2002 UT 80 at If 8, 52 P.3d 1276. "
[T]hus, the statutory words are read literally, unless
such a reading is unreasonably confused or
inoperable." Bluff 2002 UT 66 at 1f 34, 52 P.3d
1210 (quotations and citation omitted). "
Furthermore, we 'avoid interpretations that will
render portions of a statute superfluous or
inoperative.' "Martinez, 2002 UT 80 at If 8
(quoting Hall v. State Dep't of Corr., 2001 UT 34,
1fl5,24P.3d958).
[21] ^ 20 At issue in the instant case is the
meaning of the phrase "having failed to exercise
reasonable care in ascertaining the proper age."
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1206(1) (emphasis added).
FN4 "Reasonable care" is defined as "[t]hat degree
of care which a person of ordinary prudence would
exercise in the same or similar circumstances, [and
f]ailure to exercise such care is ordinary negligence.
" Black's Law Dictionary 1265 (6th ed.1990).
Haltom has presented us with no reason to believe
that the legislature intended a different meaning, or
with any case law that would support his position in
the face of this language. Compare State v.
Hamblin, 616 P.2d 376, 378-79 (Utah 1983)

(concluding that the legislature's use of the term "
negligence" warranted a conclusion that the
elements of automobile homicide were met if the
state could show that the defendant had been simply
negligence, and not criminally negligent), with State
v. Larsen, 2000 UT App 106, \ 17-18, 999 P.2d
1252 (noting that the legislature intended criminal
negligence to be the applicable mens rea for
negligent homicide when it used the term "criminal
negligence" in the statute). Although section
76-12-1206 uses neither of the terms "simple
negligence" or "ordinary negligence," it does
contain the phrase "reasonable care." "Reasonable
care" carries with it a commonly accepted
definition, and thus, we are bound by its meaning.
Consequently, we conclude that a person violates
section 76-10-1206 if they act with simple or
ordinary negligence in failing to discover that the
recipient of "harmful material" is a minor, prior to
providing the material.

FN4. The statute also creates liability for
selling "harmful material" to someone the
seller knows to be a minor. SeeUtah Code
Ann. § 76-10-1206(1) (2003). However,
Haltom is not, and has never been, accused
of actually knowing that BP was a minor at
the time of the sale. Accordingly, we limit
our analysis to Haltom's failure to
determine BP's age and whether that
failure violated the statute.
[22][23] \ 21 Having determined the simple
negligence is sufficient to violate section
76-10-1206, we turn our attention to examining
whether the evidence here was sufficient *50 to
support Haltom's conviction.FN5 "In making the
determination as to whether there is sufficient
evidence to uphold a conviction, an appellate court
does not sit as a second fact finder." State v.
Warden, 813 P.2d 1146, 1150 (Utah 1991). "
[W]hen reviewing a claim of insufficiency of the
evidence, the evidence and all inferences that may
be drawn therefrom are viewed in the light most
favorable to the jury verdict." Id.

FN5. Although Haltom's conviction was
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based on the jury's finding that he was
reckless when he sold the video, this error
is not fatal to his conviction. See State v.
Perez, 924 P.2d 1, 3 (Utah Ct.App.1996) ("
[W]e may not interfere with a jury verdict
unless upon review of the entire record,
there emerges error of sufficient gravity to
indicate that a defendant's rights were
prejudiced in a substantial manner."
(quotations and citation omitted)). The
trial court's instruction forced the State to
meet a higher mens rea standard than
required under the statute, and because the
principles underlying "simple negligence"
are incorporated within the definition of
recklessness, the jury must have, by
necessity, found Haltom also to be
negligent when they determined that he
had been reckless. Q£Utah Code Ann. §
76-2-104 (2003). Therefore, although the
trial court erred in instructing the jury, the
error could not have prejudiced Haltom
and was thus harmless.
Tf 22 The jury was presented with evidence that BP
entered Dr. John's, that she selected an adult video,
and that she took it to the counter. There, Haltom
asked her for her identification after Vadim called
him over and asked him to demonstrate how to
confirm the authenticity of a person's identification.
BP gave Haltom her driver license, and Haltom
compared the picture on the license to BP. Satisfied
that the picture was indeed of BP, he asked her to
confirm virtually every piece of material
information on the license, including her address
and social security number, but oddly not her date
of birth. BP answered all of his questions, but
Haltom became suspicious when the address she
provided did not match the street address on the
license. However, when questioned further, she
provided an equivalent coordinate address that was
identical to the one on the license. Satisfied that
the identification was hers, Haltom instructed
Vadim to sell BP the video.
| 23 Examining all of these facts, and the
inferences that can be drawn from them, in a light
most favorable to the jury's verdict, we conclude
that, as a factual matter, the evidence was sufficient.

Haltom held the license and examined it to ensure
that it was authentic. He read every line material to
ensuring the authenticity except the date of birth.
Thus we cannot say that the jury's decision that
Haltom's behavior did not constitute "reasonable
care" is unsupported.
\ 24 Haltom responds that the defense he
presented eliminated any possible negligence
finding as a matter of law. We disagree. At trial
Haltom argued that it was, and is, Dr. John's policy
to exclude from the store everyone under the age of
eighteen. Under the policy, every patron's
identification was checked at the door, so he argues
that it was reasonable for him to assume that she
was over eighteen when she reached the counter.
The State countered that in the few days that the
store was operating in Midvale before Haltom's
arrest, the officer who eventually arrested Haltom
had twice entered the store without being subjected
to the "mandatory" identification check. The State
also pointed to BP's presence in the store as
evidence that Dr. John's policy was at best
sporadically enforced. Thus, the jury was
presented with conflicting information concerning
Dr. John's policy, and it was left to determine
whether the policy alone amounted to "[t]hat degree
of care which a person of ordinary prudence would
exercise in the same or similar circumstances."
Black's Law Dictionary 1265 (6th ed.1990).
*§ 25 Even accepting Haltom's argument that a
policy could be used to immunize him from
prosecution-which is a position we do not
necessarily accept-the evidence concerning the
application of this policy was conflicting.
Consequently, it was the role of the jury to
determine whether the policy, and Haltom's claimed
reliance upon it, amounted to the reasonable care
required by section 76-10-1206. Cf. Little Am. Ref.
Co. v. Leyba, 641 P.2d 112, 114 (Utah 1982) ("The
jury is entrusted to resolve all relevant questions of
fact presented to the court. The questions of fact
include findings of negligencef.]"). The jury
determined that Haltom had been *51 reckless, and
by implication that he had violated section
76-10-1206' s duty of reasonable care, when he sold
the video to BP. Consequently, we conclude that
Haltom's conviction was supported by sufficient
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evidence.

CONCLUSION
If 26 The trial court properly denied Haltom's
motion to dismiss the charges because Haltom
failed to show that he had been entrapped as a
matter of law. The court erred in denying Haltom
the opportunity to introduce testimony concerning
Vadim's out of court statements, but Haltom was
given the opportunity to present evidence to the jury
that was sufficiently similar to the excluded
testimony rendering the trial court's error harmless.
Finally, a showing of simple negligence is sufficient
to support a conviction under section 76-10-1206's
expectation of "reasonable care." The jury found
that Haltom failed to use reasonable care in selling
an adult video to BP and the evidence supports its
verdict.
Tf 27 Accordingly, we affirm Haltom's conviction.
1f 28 WE CONCUR: JUDITH M. BILLINGS,
Presiding Judge and RUSSELL W. BENCH,
Associate Presiding Judge.
Utah App.,2005.
State v. Haltom
121 P.3d 42, 532 Utah Adv. Rep. 9, 2005 UT App
348
END OF DOCUMENT
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John Vonderhaar HALTOM, Defendant and
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Feb. 23, 2007.
Background: Defendant was convicted in the
Third District Court, Salt Lake Department, Dennis
M. Fuchs, J., of dealing in material harmful to a
minor. Defendant appealed, and the Court of
Appeals, 121 P.3d42, affirmed.

Holding: On certiorari review, the Supreme Court,
Nehring, J., held that degree of culpability required
to sustain conviction for dealing in material harmful
to minor was ordinary negligence.

Affirmed.
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Degree of culpability required to sustain conviction
for dealing in material harmful to minor, which
imposed affirmative duty to use "reasonable care"
in authenticating age of prospective purchasers of
adult material, was ordinary negligence, and not
recklessness. West's U.C.A. § 76-10-1206.
[3] Criminal Law 110 € ^ 2 3
110 Criminal Law
1101 Nature and Elements of Crime
110k 19 Criminal Intent and Malice
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Ordinary negligence, which is the basis for a civil
action for damages, is not sufficient to constitute
criminal negligence.
*793 Mark L. Shurtleff, Att'y Gen., Christine F.
Soltis, Asst. Att'y Gen., Salt Lake City, for plaintiff.
W. Andrew McCullough, Midvale, for defendant.
On Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals
NEHRING, Justice:
INTRODUCTION
f 1 John Haltom was convicted of dealing in
material harmful to a minor, a third degree felony
under Utah Code section 76-10-1206 (2000),FN1
and appealed his case to the court of appeals. Utah
Code section 76-10-1206 renders criminal the sale
of harmful material to a minor if the person making
the sale afail[s] to exercise reasonable care in
ascertaining the proper age of a minor." The court
of appeals interpreted "reasonable care" to be
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synonymous
with ordinary negligence and
concluded that the trial record contained adequate
evidence of Mr. Haltom's negligence to affirm his
conviction. We granted certiorari to consider
whether the court of appeals was correct when it
evaluated Mr. Haltom's conduct against the standard
of ordinary negligence. We hold that the court of
appeals was correct and affirm.

FN1. After the defendant was charged in
2000, the statute was amended to read that
a violation occurs when a defendant acts
recklessly or negligently in failing to
ascertain the age of a minor-buyer before
intentionally distributing material harmful
to him or her. Utah Code Ann. §
76-10-1206 (2003 & Supp.2005). All
citations to section 76-10-1206 in this
opinion refer to the statute in effect in the
year 2000 when Mr. Haltom was charged.
STANDARD OF REVIEW AND
BACKGROUND
[1] If 2 The issue we take up today presents a pure
question of law. We therefore review the decision
of the court of appeals for correctness. We need
not dwell on the facts that the jury considered in
convicting Mr. Haltom. By providing a brief
summary of the circumstances that led to Mr.
Haltom's felony conviction, we merely provide
context for our legal analysis and offer fair warning
that law enforcement officials, at least those in the
city of Midvale, are apt to display considerable zeal
in enforcing statutes that regulate the operation of
sexually oriented businesses and the sale of their
products.
Tf 3 Mr. Haltom is a co-owner of Dr. John's
Lingerie and Novelty Store. From the day it
opened, Dr. John's was not seen as a welcome
addition to Midvale's commercial community, and
the offended citizens of Midvale complained to the
police department about the store's wares. The
department sent a thirty-year-old detective to the
store who twice bought adult-only videos without
being asked to verify his age. Based on his
experience with the purchases, the detective

believed that the store would sell merchandise to a
minor. To advance his theory, the detective
solicited minors to test Dr. John's age verification
protocols. The store first turned away a
seventeen-year-old boy at its door, but Dr. John's
failed its second test.
If 4 Brittany was seventeen years old when she
entered Dr. John's on August 4, 2000. She would
turn eighteen on December 12, 2000. An employee
approached Brittany when she entered the store and
asked for her identification. She presented her
driver's license. The employee "glanced" at it but
permitted her to remain in the store. After touring
the premises for several minutes, Brittany selected
the video "Getting Wet, the Last Howl." The
video's status as material *794 harmful to a minor
was not disputed. SeeUtah Code Ann. §
76-10-1201(4), (6) (2003) (defining "harmful" and "
material"). Brittany brought the video to the
counter where Mr. Haltom was standing and sought
to purchase it. Mr. Haltom asked Brittany for her
identification, and she again produced her driver's
license. Mr. Haltom compared Brittany's features
with the photograph on the license and asked her to
repeat her social security number. He asked her for
her address and questioned her closely about it
because Brittany first gave Mr. Haltom a street
name instead of the directional coordinate number
listed on her license. The sale of the video and Mr.
Haltom's arrest followed.
If 5 The jury that convicted Mr. Haltom was
instructed that he could not be found guilty unless
he acted recklessly when he failed to accurately
ascertain Brittany's age. At the court of appeals,
Mr. Haltom claimed that, based on his own conduct
and his assumptions about the age verification
measures undertaken by the employee who
confronted Brittany when she entered the store, the
evidence fell short of establishing his recklessness.
The State countered that the trial court erred when it
instructed the jury that recklessness was the
requisite mental state for the crime. The State
argued that section 76-10-1206's "reasonable care"
language made ordinary negligence the standard to
establish culpability for the crime of dealing in
material harmful to minors. The court of appeals
agreed and found sufficient evidence of Mr.
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Haltom's negligence in the record to affirm his
conviction. We granted certiorari to review
whether the court of appeals correctly concluded
that Mr. Haltom's ordinary negligence could result
in his conviction of this third degree felony. We
hold that the court of appeals was correct.

ANALYSIS
[2] ^[ 6 According to Mr. Haltom, the State cannot
brand a person a felon for an act of ordinary
negligence. So presented, Mr. Haltom's challenge
does not ask us to resolve an ambiguity in section
76-10-1206. He concedes that an act of ordinary
negligence may breach section 76-10-1206's
affirmative duty to use "reasonable care" to
authenticate the age of prospective purchasers of
harmful material. This case, then, is not about
whether the plain language of section 76-10-1206
communicates an intention to punish negligent
conduct as a crime, because it clearly does. Rather,
it is about whether, despite the statute's plain
language, section 76-10-1206 must be interpreted to
require a degree of culpability beyond ordinary
negligence.
\ 1 Mr. Haltom proposes three reasons why
section 76-10-1206 cannot mean what it says; we
find none to be persuasive. First, Mr. Haltom
contends that Utah law governing criminal mental
states generally forecloses bringing ordinary
negligence, as opposed to criminal negligence,
within its scope. Utah Code section 76-2-101,
however, allows the Legislature to specify a mental
state that is different from the most commonly used
ones like knowing, reckless, or criminal negligence.
Specifically, section 76-2-101 states that a person
has not committed an offense unless (1) the conduct
is prohibited by law and (2) the person "acts
intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, with criminal
negligence, or with a mental state otherwise
specified in the statute defining the offense, as the
definition of the offense requires" (emphasis
added). The Legislature exercised this power
legitimately when it inserted the "reasonable care"
standard into the text of section 76-10-1206.
[3] \ 8 Drawing on language from the Utah Court

of Appeals' opinions, Mr. Haltom next contends that
the ordinary negligence standard is limited to civil
cases. He leans heavily on the statement made in
State v. Larsen that " '[ordinary negligence, which
is the basis for a civil action for damages, is not
sufficient to constitute criminal negligence.' "
2000 UT App 106, 1f 18, 999 P.2d 1252 (quoting
State v. Standiford, 769 P.2d 254, 267 (Utah 1988)
). We need not forswear the accuracy of this
statement to reject Mr. Haltom's invocation of it.
Ordinary negligence and criminal negligence are
not the same. This is not to say that only criminal
negligence may lead to criminal sanctions.
Ordinary negligence is, of course, the basis for *795
civil damage actions. Its domain is not, however,
bounded to civil actions.
If 9 Finally, Mr. Haltom attempts to stiffen his
arguments with an appeal to constitutional law.
Although his brief contains no direct citation to
either the United States Constitution or the Utah
Constitution, Mr. Haltom contends that United
States Supreme Court precedent "surely supportfs]
the contention that, in the area of distribution of
non-obscene and constitutionally protected adult
materials, mere negligence in distributing to a minor
is not a constitutionally sound standard." Mr.
Haltom looks to United States v. X-Citement Video,
Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 115 S.Ct. 464, 130 L.Ed.2d 372
(1994), as the case most supportive of this
contention. There, the Supreme Court read a
scienter requirement into a section of the Protection
of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act of
1977. On its face, the text of the act would have
permitted the conviction of persons who sold [in
interstate commerce] visual depictions of minors
engaged in explicit sexual conduct without regard to
whether the defendant could reasonably discover
the age of the persons depicted. Id. at 69, 115 S.Ct.
464. The Supreme Court found it appropriate to
fill the scienter gap with the "knowing" mental state
that Congress assigned to other provisions of the
act. Id at 78, 115 S.Ct 464. The Supreme Court,
however, did not go so far as to infer that holding a
defendant criminally accountable for distributing
adult materials to a minor through "mere negligence
" would offend the United States Constitution.
Indeed, the Court's statements suggest the opposite.
It noted that little or no mens rea might be
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necessary to justify proscribing conduct in which "
the perpetrator confronts the underage victim
personally and may reasonably be required to
ascertain the victim's age." Id at 72 n. 2, 115 S.Ct.
464.This describes precisely the encounter between
Mr. Haltom and Brittany. In short, the United
States Supreme Court has imposed no constitutional
impediment to making merely negligent conduct
criminal, and neither do we. Accordingly, we
affirm the court of appeals.
If 10 Chief Justice DURHAM, Associate Chief
Justice WILKINS, Justice DURRANT, and Justice
PARRISH concur in Justice NEHRING's opinion.
Utah,2007.
State v. Haltom
156 P.3d 792, 572 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 2007 UT 22
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